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ABSTRACT: Present economy and society are under a “digital revolution”. Digital platforms 
connect service and product suppliers to recipients all around the world creating new businesses 
and changing business models in place. Old-fashioned informal gig-economy and sharing practices 
by using the new technology seem to change consumption and production patterns to more efficient 
and sustainable ones… or maybe not. This “new economy” also poses several challenges to law 
questioning the adequacy of  concepts and regulations in force. Disputes with authorities and 
incumbent industries end up in violence or in courts, including the European Court of  Justice. 
We intend to give an overview of  those challenges, especially in light of  European Union law and 
following a multilevel constitutionalist approach, which we believe is best suited to respond to the 
regulatory challenges of  this “new economy”. 
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I. Introduction 
The revolutionary significance of  digital platforms to the economy and business 
was proclaimed1. Digital platforms are considered as the engine of  a “new economy” 
and the core of  all new business models not for the future, but right now.2 In fact, 
we are witnessing a societal revolution that brings us closer to McLuhan’s “global 
village”3. Focusing especially the cybersecurity risks, Ingolf  Pernice4 points to its 
constitutional relevance, and speaks of  a “digital society” as a “digital constellation” 
with new opportunities and risks for Law, Governance and Democracy and proposes 
a multilevel constitutionalist approach. In our view, the regulatory challenges posed 
by digital platforms on the so-called “sharing/collaborative economy” have a 
constitutional relevance and should be approached from a multilevel constitutionalist 
perspective as well.
Besides transformations in long existing industries, like automobile, health, 
financing, and education, digital platforms brought the emergence of  the “sharing/
collaborative economy”, disrupting tourism or urban mobility. Brian Walsh labelled 
the “sharing economy” as “one of  the 10 ideas that will change the world.”5 They 
induced major social changes, namely allowing many people with middle income to 
travel and others to work escaping unemployment or getting an extra-income. 
What is the significance of  this revolution? The views differ.6 The data on 
the under-utilization of  cars in some EU Member States predict the efficiency and 
sustainability potential of  the sharing economy.7 Some authors are more sceptical 
1 Geoffrey Parker, Marshall W. Van Alstyne and Sangeet Paul Choudary, Platform Revolution. How 
networked markets are transforming the economy and how to make them work for you (NY/London: W. W. 
Norton & Company Ltd, 2016).
2 According to Accenture, digital economy accounted for 22% of  global GDP in 2015. A poll in the 
US showed that in January 2016 42% of  Americans have already used a sharing economy service and 
22% provided one. Accenture Technology Vision 2016 People First: The Primacy of  People in a Digital Age, 2016, 
p. 6, accessed November, 10, 2018, https://www.accenture.com/t20170227T030304Z__w__/us-en/_
acnmedia/PDF-20/Accenture-Technology-Trends-Technology-Vision-updated.pdf. The figures in Japan 
are very different with no more of  1% using such a service. See Michael A. Cusumano, “The Sharing 
Economy Meets Reality,” Communications of  the ACM, vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2018): 26-28, http://www.
teic.tus.ac.jp/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Puzzle_of_Japanese_Innovation_and_Entrepreneurship.
pdf. In the European Union the percentage of  users in April 2018 was 23% (in 2016 the proportion 
was 17%). European Union, “The Use of  Collaborative Platforms”, Flash Eurobarometer 438, March 
2016, p. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/
instruments/FLASH/surveyKy/2112; European Union, “The Use of  the Collaborative Economy”, Flash 
Eurobarometer Report 467, 2018, p. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/
survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/surveyky/2184. On the other hand, this last survey reveals that 
only 6% of  Europeans offer services via collaborative platforms, and only 1% on a regular basis. (p. 6). 
Accommodation (57%) and transport (51%) are the main services provided via platforms (p. 4).
3  This expression was part of  the speech “The medium is the message” made in 1967 at the National 
Broadcasting Corporation, accessed December 28, 2018, http://www.marshallmcluhanspeaks.com/.
4 “Risk management in the digital constellation – a constitutional perspective”, Part I and Part II, IDP 
– Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política, n.º 26, (February 2018): 83-94 and No. 27 (September 2018): 79-
95, http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/idp.v0i26.3124 and http://doi.org/10.7238/idp.v0i27.3125.
5 “Today’s smart choice: Don’t own. Share”, Time, March 17, 2011, http://content.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,2059521_2059717,00.html.
6 For an overview of  different approaches, Will Sutherland and Mohammed Hossein Jarrahi, “The Sharing 
Economy and Digital Platforms: A Review and Research Agenda,” International Journal of  Information 
Management Volume 43 (December 2018): 328-341, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2018.07.004.
7 European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe in the Sharing Economy. Economic, Social and Legal Challenges 
and Opportunities, January 2016, p. 82-84, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/search.
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and highlight the negative consequences on workers’ rights and conditions,8 risks 
for consumers’ protection,9 liability issues,10 and disruption of  fair competition and 
of  public policy requirements,11 gentrification of  cities and rise of  house rentals.12 
This economic sector is very diverse, ranging from global “unicorns”, with market 
capitalization of  billions of  dollars, even if  some have no profits yet,13 to micro 
companies struggling to survive.
Enthusiasm about “sharing/collaborative economy” has cooled. If  the news 
on death of  a truly “sharing economy” are surely exaggerated, it is worth noting 
that people’s interest is bigger in Latin America and Asia-Pacific than in Europe 
or North America.14 Explanations may be the absence of  regulated trustworthy 
services, the importance of  informal economy and the appealing drive of  modern, 
easily accessible and less costly services.15 China, in turn, has been revealed to be a 
difficult market for western platforms like Uber that, after heavy losses, finally gave 
up.16 In Europe and North America, the digital platform ecosystem is dominated 
html?word=sharing+economy; Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers, What’s Mine Is Yours (New York: 
Collins, 2010); Boyd Cohen and Jan Kietzmann, “Ride On! Mobility Business Models for the Sharing 
Economy,” Organization & Environment 27 (2014): 279-96, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2519349.
8 Robert Reich, “Why the Sharing Economy is Hurting Workers–and what must be done,” 27 November 
27, 2015, http://robertreich.org/post/134080559175; Carles Muntaner, “Digital Platforms, Gig 
Economy, Precarious Employment, and the Invisible Hand of  Social Class,” International Journey of  
Health Sciences (September 2018): 597-600, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020731418801413.
9 Christopher Koopman, Mathew Mitchell and Adam Thierer, “The Sharing Economy and Consumer 
Protection Regulation: The case for Policy Change,” The Journal of  Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law 
Volume 8, Issue 2 (2015): 529-545, https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ref
erer=&httpsredir=1&article=1130&context=jbel.
10 Albert Ruda Gonzalez, “Responsabilidad por hechos ajenos en la economia colaborativa. El caso 
de Uber”, Collaborative Economy: Challenges and Oportunities. Proceedings of  the 14th Conference on Internet, 
Law & Politics, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 21-22 June, 2018, (Barcelona: Huygens 
Editorial, 2018), 424-440, http://symposium.uoc.edu/_files/_event/_12116/_editorFiles/file/
IDP_2018_oct18%20(1).pdf. The main disadvantage users pointed to the collaborative platforms 
was “not knowing who is responsible in the event of  a problem with the service provided through 
the platform.” European Union, “The Use of  Collaborative Platforms,” Flash Eurobarometer 438, 
March 2016, p. 4; in a more recent survey done in April 2018 and published in October 2018 liability 
continued to be the major concern. European Union, “The Use of  the Collaborative Economy,” 
Flash Eurobarometer Report 467, 2018, p. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/
index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/flash/surveyky/2184.
11 In addition, the environmental and social benefits are yet to prove. Koen Franken and Juliet Shor, 
“Putting the Sharing Economy into Perspective,” Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 23 
(2017), 3-10, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2017.01.003.
12 Paula Imperatore, “Airbnb and the City: one conflict, two ideas of  city. The case of  Barcelona”, 
Collaborative Economy: Challenges and Oportunities. Proceedings of  the 14th Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. 
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 21-22 June, 2018 (Barcelona, Huygens Editorial, 2018), 
308-325, http://symposium.uoc.edu/_files/_event/_12116/_editorFiles/file/IDP_2018_oct18%20
(1).pdf.
13 Uber is to be valued at $120 billion. Trefis Team, “How Uber could Justify a $ 120 billion valuation”, 
Forbes.com, December 3, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/12/03/how-
uber-could-justify-a-120-billion-valuation/#5b3d2cea7f9b.
14 Nielsen, “Global Consumers embrace the Share Economy”, May 28, 2014, https://www.nielsen.
com/lb/en/press-room/2014/global-consumers-embrace-the-share-economy.html.
15 Adam Ozimek and Modeled Behaviour, “The Sharing Economy And Developing Countries,” 
Forbes, August 4, 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2014/08/04/the-sharing-
economy-and-developing-countries/#7f6081b27e0b.
16 Ronaldo C. Parente, José-Maurício G. Geleilate, and Ke Rong, “The Sharing Economy Globalization 
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more and more by companies, and the regulatory constraints imposed may help to 
explain that.17 Scandals surrounding the most prominent platforms revealed a dark 
“face” of  the “sharing/collaborative economy”. The days of  innocence are over. 
Law, at the various levels, European, national, and local, must be aware of  the diverse 
effects, risks, different regulatory demands, and of  the potential benefits for the 
economy and society.
There is a consensus that digital platforms pose major challenges to business but 
also to law, questioning long accepted frameworks, principles and concepts. In fact, 
there is no legal certainty. Are they out of  the scope of  existing regulations or does the 
fragmented regulation in force across sectors and nations, regions and cities, apply to 
them? Are old concepts and rules still fit or does this new business model demand new 
regulations? Should the EU enact new rules? One thing is undeniable, recent as it is, 
the platform business has proved to be a very litigious economic sector all around the 
world, particularly involving ride services company Uber.18 Only within the European 
Union judicial system since 2015, there were four cases relating to Uber.19
Our purpose is to discuss some of  the legal challenges, identified especially in 
regard to transport platforms. We believe that the answer to these challenges is the 
theoretical framework of  multilevel constitutionalism and taking into account some of  
its fundamental and operating principles, in particular, subsidiarity.
II. Digital platforms and “sharing economy”. Understanding a new 
business model
1. What are we talking about when we talk about “Sharing 
Economy?”
There is no consensus surrounding this new economic reality,20 beginning with 
the name itself.21 Starting with the European Institutions, the European Parliament 
speaks of  “sharing economy” whereas the European Commission speaks of  




17 The conditions imposed by rules in Portugal to urban mobility platforms or hosting are very hard to 
meet by non-professional providers. Like happened in other cities, in Lisbon and Oporto the hosting 
business (“alojamento local”) is more and more concentrated and run professionally including hotel 
conglomerates. Ride hailing is dominated more and more by rental companies that counterpart with 
Uber and hire the drivers. The new Portuguese law will favour that trend. On the uneven distribution 
of  economic benefits see Franken and Shor, “Putting the Sharing Economy into Perspective…”, 7.
18 In the US, between 2012 and 2015 Uber was involved in 173 lawsuits. Leila Abboud and Jeremy 
Wagstaff, “INSIGHT-Legal troubles, market realities threaten Uber’s global push,” Reuters, October 
5, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/uber-global-idUSL1N1203IE20151005.
19 A recent reference from the “Juge d’instruction du Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris” (Case 
C-390/18) concerns Airbnb services questions the possible conflict between its services and rules 
relating to the exercise of  the profession of  real estate agent in France, laid down by Law No. 70-9 of  
2 January 1970 on intermediaries in real-estate transactions (‘the Hoguet Law’). 
20 Rachel Botsman, “The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition,” FastCompany, November 21, 
2013, https://www.fastcompany.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-definition#10.
21 On the multiple terms and concepts find in literature, see Georgina Görög, “The Definitions of  
Sharing Economy: A Systematic Literature Review,” Management 13, n. 2 (Summer, 2018): 175-189, 
https://doi.org/10.26493/1854-4231.13.175-189.
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“collaborative economy”. Georgina Görög22 found 26 terms associated with digital 
platform business models. We face “floating signifiers”23 and semantic disputes24 
but also epistemic controversies with important implications. This sector has a very 
diverse scope and labels and definitions may validly vary depending on the focus of  
the analysis.
The European Parliament25 highlights the efficiency promoted by digital 
platforms by improving the hiring (“sharing”) of  assets, reducing their under-
utilisation. After the monetizing evolution and professionalization, “sharing” is not 
the right term and “access economy” should be preferred.  “Sharing,” points to 
optimize the use of  underutilized assets and most of  services provided through 
digital platforms now do not meet that requirement. In an “access economy”, the 
purpose is not to own but to use assets, changing the pattern of  economic activity and 
overcoming the traditional selling/buying one. In this economic and social model, 
value does not rest in ownership but in access to use.26 That is a new paradigm for 
“liberal” XIX century law after the first challenge posed by intangible assets of  the 
global finance economy.
“On-demand economy” is another proposal. “sharing” would restrict interactions 
to the consumer-to-consumer interaction for temporary access of  physical goods. This 
is too narrow, because there is no reason not to include the provisions of  services 
in a non-professional way. The issue is that most of  the times, services provided in 
platforms, even if  they are not professional (they are performed on spare time and 
provided on a task basis), they represent the old informal “gig economy” now using 
cutting-edge technologies reaching worldwide.27 
Another definition is “crowd economy”28 and this may be a two-sided form of  
popular capitalism. Platforms connect a global crowd of  insulated service providers 
to a global crowd of  consumers, and they all contribute to the platform ecosystem 
feeding the “network effects” essential in this business model.
A very strict semantic approach could have very little economic significance.29 
22 The Author presents definitions of  the most prominent 15 popping in google search results. 
After “digital economy”, a general expression for any economic activity enhanced through digital 
technology, “sharing economy” is the most popular one. Georgina Görög, “The Definitions of  Sharing 
Economy”, 180-181.
23 Cristiano Codagnone, Federico Biagi and Fabienne Abadie, The Passions and the Interests: Unpacking the 
Sharing Economy, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. JRC Science and Policy Report EUR 
27941 EN, 2016, doi:10.2791/474555. http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/
JRC101279/jrc101279.pdf.
24 Russull Belk, “Sharing v. pseudo-sharing in web 2.0,” Anthropologist, vol. 18, issue 1 (2014): 7-23, http://
www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/T-Anth/Anth-18-0-000-14-Web/Anth-18-1-000-14-Abst-PDF/
T-ANTH-18-1-007-14-1106-Belk-Russ/T-ANTH-18-1-007-14-1106-Belk-Russ-Tx%5b2%5d.pdf.
25 European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe…, I-43. 
26 Asta Daunoriené, Aura Drakšaité, Vytautas Snieška, and Gitana Valodkiené, “Evaluating Sustainability 
of  Sharing Economy Business Models,” Procedia: Social and Behavioural Sciences 213 (2015): 836-841, 
https://ac.els-cdn.com/S1877042815058413/1-s2.0-S1877042815058413-main.pdf?_tid=eb6ffcda-
8b07-487b-8e33-189477432d8a&acdnat=1547944105_d467a7aba5867d84855ddabb9d8f9451. 
27 The crudest example is the platform “Mechanical Turk”. It can be viewed as a rebirth of  the pre-
industrial economy of  homemade task work now performed by a multinational multitude of  isolated 
workers incapable of  organizing and defending their interests in face of  anonymous global counterparts. 
For Robert Reich it risks being a regression. Robert Reich, “Why the Sharing Economy is Hurting Workers…”.
28 Arun Sundararajan, The Sharing Economy, The End of  Employment and the Rise of  Crowd Based Capitalism 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016).
29 European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe…, I-43.
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Definitions too broad or too narrow may not be useful30 but also, the absence of  a 
definition about the concept and its scope makes it more difficult to have a common 
approach at the European level.31 For that reason, the European Institutions present 
broad concepts and admit that the regulatory approach must be cautious, diverse-aware 
and on a case-by-case basis. This is most important as this is not a mature field and 
innovation is paramount.
Aware of  all that, a pragmatic view focused on the potential benefits and on 
risks is wise. In 2015, the European Commission32 presented the following definition 
of  “collaborative economy”: “a complex ecosystem of  on-demand services and 
temporary use of  assets based on exchanges via online platforms”.
Many of  the services that provided B2C (“business to consumer”) are new means 
of  rental. Sharing assets like households or cars, or commodities like tools is not a new 
phenomenon but its reach was limited to friends and neighbours (at the most, real 
estate brokers established locally mediated it). P2P (“peer to peer”) C2C (“consumer 
to consumer”) are as old as human relations and the twist given by digital platforms, 
besides a modern and trendy patine, is that a service with only local/regional or at the 
most, national reach now reaches globally33 and allows for increased efficiency and 
new earnings. Digital platforms improved information about assets, counterparts and 
improved the security of  contracts and payments, reducing the transaction costs.
Digital platforms may be a new business or not. They may be a very efficient 
instrument of  an intermediation service (in itself  an old business), connecting service 
providers to potential clients. It may be a new tool in long established industries like 
automobile or health changing their business models.34 Under the designation of  
“sharing/collaborative economy”, we find very different realities, profit and non-
profit, local and global, specialised and non-specialised.35 Maybe a more careful look 
is in order to find out very different business surrounding platforms. Focusing on 
mobility only, there are platforms that simply provide an intermediary service without 
any control over the transport between professional drivers and customers (MyTaxi), 
others that connect a driver willing to share a journey with someone to split the costs 
(Blablacar), and others that organise a transport service on-demand for a passenger for 
a journey that otherwise would not take place (Uber).36 
In common, there is the use of  a digital platform to develop production or 
consumption relations.
30 Advocate-General Macjel Szupnar considers that a broad definition such as the Commission one is 
useless for drawing any legal framework (Opinion, case C-434/15, “Elite Taxi”, footnote 13).
31 Vassilis Hatzopoulos and Sofia Roma, “Caring for Sharing? The Collaborative Economy under EU 
law,” Common Market Law Review 54, Issue 1 (2017): 81-128, 84.
32 European Commission, Public Consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, 
data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy, 2015, p. 3, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platformsonline-intermediaries-data-
and-cloud.
33 Graça Enes, “The collaborative economy as a matter of  competences between the EU and 
Member States. The case(s) of  Uber,” Collaborative Economy: Challenges and Oportunities. Proceedings 
of  the 14th Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 21-22 
June, 2018 (Barcelona, Huygens Editorial, 2018), 381-395, 382, http://symposium.uoc.edu/_files/_
event/_12116/_editorFiles/file/IDP_2018_oct18%20(1).pdf  
34 What was certainly new were the digital technologies that allowed the creation of  digital platforms 
but this is not our subject.
35 B2B platforms get less attention.
36 Franken and Shor, “Putting the Sharing Economy into Perspective…”, 5, ftn. 1.
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2. Digital platforms, the core of  a new business model. The case 
of  transport and accommodation platforms
2.1. Digital platforms – a new business model
Do digital platforms change the nature of  the economy and society or, at the 
least, of  business?37 Platforms were identified as “the most profound disruptive 
change in the global macroeconomic environment since the Industrial Revolution.”38 
May digital platforms be compared to the steam machine or the internal combustion 
engine? In fact, even if  the business is not new, the business model seems to be new 
and revolutionary in economy and society. We will restrict our analysis to business 
and especially to mobility platforms, but the same evolution is seen in societal values 
and vindications.39
Let us start with the puzzling words of  Tom Goodwin, Sr. VP of  “Strategy 
Havas Media”: “In 2015, Uber the world’s largest taxi company owns no vehicles, 
Facebook the world’s most popular media owner creates no content, Alibaba the 
most valuable retailer has no inventory, and Airbnb the world’s largest hotelier owns 
no real estate”.40 
Reliance on external suppliers and the absence of  ownership of  the physical 
assets used in the services provided is the common DNA to the most prominent digital 
platforms.41 This feature is not negative and makes it possible to grow worldwide much 
easier because they do not have the huge costs implied by owning local assets and 
risk is shifted to micro-entrepreneurs. The major 15 ‘platform’ companies represent 
$2.6 trillion in market capitalization and are stars of  capital investment “angels”42 that 
made them “unicorns”. Their almost unique asset is the virtual platform and their 
investment focus on technology development, intermediation, market strategies, 
and customer service, allows them to be simple and agile organisations. A good 
example is Uber: it operates in more than 60 countries and had total revenues of  
more than $1.5 billion in 2015, and still “coordinates all operations such as software 
development, marketing, and legal issues from its San Francisco headquarters.”43
This digital platform business is an extremely dynamic and innovative business, 
though the most important innovations are not products or services but the change 
platforms induce in business models.44 That is why also incumbent industries under the 
competitive challenge from those platform industries and every other business, from 
major global corporations to local service providers or start-ups, are rapidly following 
the move to digital platforms and are deeply changing their competitive strategy 
37 A systematic review of  literature on platforms can be found in Llewellyn D. W. Thomas, Erkko 
Autio and David M. Gann, “Architectural Leverage: Putting Platforms in Context,” Academy of  
Perspectives, vol. 28, No. 2, 2014, https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2011.0105.
38 Accenture, Accenture Technology Vision 2016…, 45.
39 The “punchline” “if  it’s not on the internet it doesn’t exist” represents well this new societal 
trend. A new digital society inherently global is being built and “[it] reflects a level of  social and 
communicative relations among people that is comparable to those at the local, regional, national and 
supranational levels of  society, though still more informal and with less attachment.” Ingolf  Pernice, 
“Risk management in the digital constellation … (part I)”, 90.
40 Apud Hamish McRae, “Facebook, Airbnb, Uber, and the unstoppable rise of  the content non-generators,” 
Independent, 5 May 5, 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/hamish-mcrae/
facebook-airbnb-uber-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-content-non-generators-10227207.html 
41 Parker et al., “Platform Revolution…”, 2.
42 Accenture, Accenture Technology Vision 2016…, 38.
43 Parente et al., “The Sharing Economy Globalization Phenomenon…”, 54.
44 Accenture, Accenture Technology Vision 2016…, 37.
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and business model.45 Digital platforms integrate with dominant corporations and 
these become platform based.46 Moreover, disruption goes on with spill-over across 
sectors. An illustrative example is Uber: after disrupting the taxi industry, it organised 
UberEats, and recently went into health industry with UberHealth.47 In addition, 
Airbnb expanded its services from accommodation to “touristic experiences” with 
local providers. 
This new business model works as a complex “ecosystem” and its operative 
core is the digital platform around which products and services are designed and 
organised, all stakeholders and customers, and even public authorities interact and 
evolve, in sum all value is created.48 In “ecosystems” all participants provide services 
to the “community” and are mutually dependent, be it the connection, the ride, 
the organising of  all interactions, and even the comments posted that feed the 
reputational system of  quality control. The respective role may be complementary 
and even blurred (a ‘producer’ is also a ‘consumer’ becoming a ‘prosumer’). 
In this sense, digital economy is inherently a “collaborative economy”. Contrary 
to traditional product business models that are linear, this new model is driven by 
“demand economies of  scale”, the so called “internet effects”, connecting and 
mutually benefiting producers, consumers, developers and other stakeholders and 
it works by multiple inputs and feedback. Finally, these new “ecosystems” are open 
marketplaces that range across the globe,49 overstepping borders, turning local 
business global, and making global business locally relevant because of  the disruptive 
effects they have on that level. It is precisely this global reach of  “internet effects” 
that allow the continuing expansion of  providers and clients that promote the 
exponential growth of  the most successful platforms.50
In 2016, the European Commission explains further this “complex ecosystem”: 
“[it] refers to business models where activities are facilitated by collaborative 
platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary usage of  goods or 
services often provided by private individuals. (…) involves three categories of  
actors: (i) service providers who share assets, resources, time and/or skills – these 
can be private individuals offering services on an occasional basis (‘peers’) or service 
providers acting in their professional capacity (‘professional services providers’); (ii) 
users of  these; and (iii) intermediaries that connect – via online platform – providers 
with users and that facilitate transactions between them (‘collaborative platforms’).” 
45 Parente et al., “The Sharing Economy Globalization Phenomenon…”, 56. 
46 Uber ensured an association with complementary industries like Hertz, Toyota (this corporation has 
recently invested $500 million in Uber) or Volvo to facilitate drivers’ access to rental or lease services. 
Lyft associated with General Motors. MyTaxi is part of  the Daimler group. BMW has its own transport 
ride platform – Car2go. Parente et al., “The Sharing Economy Globalization Phenomenon…”, 55-56. The other 
side of  the coin is the risk of  monopoly and fewer benefits spread to developers or consumers.
47 Accenture, Accenture Technology Vision 2016…, 51.
48 Accenture, Accenture Technology Vision 2016…, 37.
49 Parente et al., “The Sharing Economy Globalization Phenomenon…”, 52-64.
50 Recent studies, nevertheless, identify limits to growth in mobility platforms resulting from the fragmented 
and local nature of  the transport service provided that limit the demand. The same holds for temporary 
accommodation. Tourism may be an important contribution to overcome this fragmentation but that too 
is subject to economic floating. Regulations may also impose limits and increase costs, as became evident 
in numerous cities around the world. Michael A. Cusumano speaks of  “facing the reality”, “The Sharing 
Economy faces Reality”, 27. The Author foresees a shadow future for Uber. For a very positive view, Trefis 
Team, “How Uber could Justifie…”. Solicitar a autora que verifique a referência em destaque, pois o título 
previamente citado deste autor é “The Sharing Economy Meets Reality” (nota n. 2)
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2019
24 Graça Enes
Collaborative economy transactions generally do not involve a change of  ownership 
and are carried out for profit or not-for-profit.51 
In this new collaborative business model, value is created from developers and 
even consumers outside the core company/platform. This may well be a positive 
means of  creating new significant communities across the world but there are risks 
that may demand regulatory control, for instance, the risk of  predatory behaviour of  
giant platforms exploring local providers such as drivers. Also, negative externalities, 
especially at local level, be they on incumbent industries or related to public policy 
requirements deserve attention from regulatory authorities.
Because of  the diversity of  this sector, regulatory demands are not uniform, 
and any regulatory intervention must be diversity aware and must understand the 
business under scrutiny and its economic and societal impact very well.
2.2. The “business” of  transport and accommodation platforms
We are certainly before a new business model but that does not mean necessarily 
that the business itself  is new. What is the nature of  mobility platforms business? This 
too is relevant to approach the regulatory issues at stake. The cases involving Uber 
in the CJEU had these questions at heart. Uber claimed to be an information society 
service provider according to the definition of  Directive 98/34 (codified by Directive 
2015/1535), that is, a service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by 
means of  electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and 
storage of  data, and at the individual request of  a recipient of  a service.
The European Parliament and the European Commission present a very “platform 
friendly view”.52 First, they distinguish the connection service provided by platforms 
from the underlying service provided, for instance transport or accommodation. In 
fact, regarding mobility platforms, their approach does not view the service provided 
by the platform as a new “business model of  urban transport”, but as an intermediation 
service. In this view, normally there are three contracts: an intermediation contract 
between the driver and the platform, an intermediation contract between the passenger 
and the platform, and a transport contract between the passenger and the driver. 
According to the European Commission, if  platforms limit themselves to match 
service providers and consumers, that connection service is an information society 
service and should not be subject to authorization or licence, as they benefit from 
the Internal Market freedom to provide services under the Treaty rules (Articles 56 
to 62 TFEU) and Directive 2006/123 (Directive on Internal Market services) and the 
E-commerce Directive (2000/31). Even if  local regulations apply to the underlying 
service provider, they do not bind the platform.53 Moreover, the specific nature of  this 
service could make the local regulatory frameworks in force for services similar to the 
one offered through the platform, unfit for purpose. In fact, the first alternative is not 
favourable to the platform because it may impose such demanding conditions that 
impedes the survival of  the platform, as happened in Denmark where Uber closed its 
operation in April 2017. Even if  platforms are also providers of  the underlying local 
51 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions. A European Agenda for the 
collaborative economy, COM (2016) 356 final, Brussels, 2.6.2016, 3.
52 The European Parliament speaks of  the increased transparency of  platforms. European Parliament, 
The Cost of  Non-Europe…, I-72.
53 European Commission, A European Agenda for the collaborative economy, 33-34.
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service, authorisation or licencing should be imposed only where necessary for reasons 
of  public policy.54
The European Parliament55 admits the convenience of  creating “a hybrid category 
for information society services” that prevents the risk of  a superficial regulatory 
equality that is an unproportioned burden on the “sharing economy”. 
The Advocate-General Macjel Szupnar and the CJEU in the case Elite Taxi. 
held a different view in the cases involving UberX/Pop and found that the platform 
business was the underlying service of  transport.56 Regardless of  the nature of  the 
contract between the platform and the drivers,57 no transport contract was found 
between the passenger using the platform and the driver. Following the Opinion of  
the Advocate-General in case Elite Taxi, the Court concluded that the transport service 
provided to the passenger was organised by Uber. Uber defined its standard features 
and conditions relating to vehicles and drivers, and the price.58 The digital platform that 
allowed the connection between a passenger demanding a ride and the driver was not 
separable from the ride service and, therefore, could not be viewed as an autonomous 
intermediation service. It was the innovative tool of  a new business model for transport 
services,59 not a business in itself. Digital platforms brought new global players into the 
business of  urban transport services,60 which until then, were in the hands of  local 
companies, forcing changes and raising several concerns and regulatory issues. The 
54 European Commission, A European Agenda for the collaborative economy, 4.
55 European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe…, 28.
56 To understand the reasoning of  the Advocate-General and the Court in the cases before the 
ECJ, see Graça Enes, “Uber and EU law. Information Society Service or Transport? A question of  
competences,” The Sharing Economy. Legal Problems of  a Permutations and Combinations Society, Eds. Regina 
Redinha, Maria Raquel Guimarães and Francisco Liberal Fernandes (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2019), 410-438; “The collaborative Economy as a Matter of  Competences…”. In 
most of  the cases around the world courts shared the same view that Uber was a transport provider.
57 This issue is also important and was the subject of  major litigation in the US and Europe. In 
the United Kingdom the “Aslam and Farrar saga” concerning the statute of  drivers as independent 
contractors or workers is going on for years. Considering them as workers is an important argument 
in favour of  labelling the service provided by Uber as transport. In the United Kingdom Uber was 
licenced for five years as a “private hire operator” by Transport for London (TFL) in 2012. The 
licence was not renewed in 2017 on grounds that Uber did not comply with required standards; 
after appeal, in 2018 it was granted a provisional licence for 15 months (ending in September 2019) 
under the scrutiny of  TFL after the Westminster Court considered Uber has significantly changed its 
practices and fulfilled several conditions.
58 Ownership of  key assets used to provide the underlying service was irrelevant contrary to what 
the European Commission proposed in the Agenda for the Collaborative Economy (in fact, in transport 
business using not owned vehicles is common).
59 Advocate-General Macjel Szupnar defines the concept of  “transport” as “[c]onveying people or 
goods from point A to point B” as long as that is the main objective of  the activity in question 
(paragraphs 29 and 34 of  the Opinion in cases C-340/14 and C-341/14). Also the European 
Commission “Handbook on the implementation of  the Services Directive”, states driving schools 
services, removal services, car rental, car rental services, funeral services or aerial photography 
services are not excluded from the scope of  Article 2/2/d) of  Directive 2006/123, http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/docs/services-dir/guides/handbook_en.pdf. Regarding the 
concept of  “transport” see also Judgment of  15 October 2015, Grupo Itevelesa and Others, C-168/14, 
EU:C:2015:685, paragraphs 45 and 46, and Opinion 2/15 (Free Trade Agreement with Singapore) of  16 
May 2017, EU:C:2017:376, paragraph 61.
60 In the US, the United States District Court for the Northern District of  California on 18 June 
2016 stated “Uber is ultimately a transportation company, albeit a technologically sophisticated one.” 
“Order-Denying-Plaintiffs-Motion-for-Preliminary Approval of  Settlement”, https://www.cand.
uscourts.gov/EMC/OConnorvUberTechnologies. 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2019
26 Graça Enes
first one the CJEU had to deal with was the submission of  Uber to national and local 
rules imposing authorisations and licences on taxis and other urban transport services, 
instead of  the rules governing provision of  services in the Single Market, especially 
information society services (respectively, Directive 2006/123 and Directive 2000/31).
The case of  Uber-France approached similar issues but from a different angle: did 
the restrictions imposed at national level regardless of  their respect to transport infringe 
Directive 98/34 (codified by Directive 2015/1535)? This Act imposes on Member 
States the obligation to notify the Commission of  technical regulations that may hinder 
the freedom of  information society services. Disrespect of  such an obligation impedes 
Member States from imposing those standards on companies. Uber claimed France 
could not impose the law forbidding the use of  digital platforms in transport services 
because it did not notify the Commission of  that rule. According to the Court, that 
restriction imposed by national rules was not relevant in the context of  transport services 
because these were excluded from the scope of  Internal Market rules on freedom to 
provide services and that same directive excludes from its scope, rules that only in an 
implicit or incidental manner, affect information society services. The matter deserved 
more careful consideration. By enacting this law, France distinguishes the transport 
service from the connection established through a digital platform.61 This distinction 
gives autonomy to this last service and if  it is independent, it is naturally an information 
society service. Forbidding this last one is clearly a restriction on the freedom enshrined 
in the Treaty and in the Directives 2006/123 and 2000/31. These restrictions should 
be submitted to the test of  public policy reasons and proportionality. The Court simply 
ignores all that and considers the French law as a regulation on transport. The Richard 
Leipold case posed similar questions but it was removed from the register the same day 
of  the judgment in Uber France was handed down.62
Platforms like Blablacar or Mytaxi presented different and much less demanding 
regulatory challenges. 
The first one corresponds more faithfully to “sharing”, since it allows a driver 
that would anyway do a journey and has a spare seat to share its journey and the costs 
(instead of  profit or remuneration) with another person. The positive effects with 
regards to efficiency and sustainability are evident; from reducing vehicles on the road 
from a public policy perspective, a more careful look may be in order, because this 
may run against the incentives to use public collective transport more “environment 
and traffic friendly”. Despite the influence of  the platform over the conditions of  the 
journey, Blablacar was found to provide only an information society service by the 
Juzgado Mercantil n.º 2 de Madrid.63 There are three contracts: one between Blablacar 
and the driver, another between Blablacar and the passenger, both information society 
services, and a third one of  private transport between the driver and the passenger.
The other platforms provide the connection between a professional and licenced 
61 In case Uber France (paragraph 22) Advocate General Szupnar declares the control exercised by Uber 
over the drivers is similar to that of  a franchisor over its franchisees. In a franchise relationship, more 
than a control of  the relationship with the customers, it is the use of  a brand and the value associated 
with it that implies an extensive conditioning of  the business, mostly accompanied by the provision 
of  support services by the franchisor. This conclusion is contradictory to the reasoning in Elite Taxi 
because the franchisees conclude and provide directly and by themselves the services to consumers, 
something that does not happen with Uber drivers.
62 Graça Enes, “The Collaborative Economy as a Matter of  Competences…”, 391.
63 Sentencia n.º 30/2017, 2 February 2017, https://www.lenguajejuridico.com/sentencia-del-juzgado-
madrid-caso-blablacar/. 
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driver with a passenger. Unlike the former case, in this one, the passenger defines the 
starting point and the point of  arrival of  the trip. The driver, no matter the payment 
method, sets the cost of  the service. There are three contracts: one intermediation 
contract between the platform and the driver and in this one, the platform provides the 
driver with another means (the platform app) to reach clients (especially young people 
and tourists), a B2B contract; one intermediation contract between the platform and 
the passenger allowing this access to taxis everywhere around the globe with the same 
app, a B2C contract; and, one transport contract between the passenger and the driver, 
a B2C contract too. In respect of  the first contract, commercial law is the adequate 
framework; in respect of  the other two, consumer law should apply. Some regulatory 
challenges emerge regarding business practices and consumer protection (information 
duties, data protection, etc.).
On the other hand, the parallel made with accommodation platforms where the 
features and conditions of  rental are not set in the same way even by the most prominent 
platforms is illustrative of  the diversity of  digital platforms business. Accommodation 
is inherently a service not fit to a similar standardisation, as is urban transport. On the 
opposite, global digital platforms like Airbnb or Homeway were able to strive in face 
of  the huge global players in this sector (be they luxury or low cost) offering locally 
embedded and diverse accommodation that those hotel chains cannot offer. The 
accommodation characteristics and experience depends heavily on the local provider 
choices. Also, the price, even if  the platform tries to influence (for instance through 
platform fixing of  dynamic prices), it is set by the owner of  the accommodation. If  the 
fact that the payment is necessarily run by the platform (and not all platforms impose 
that condition) is devalued, all these features point to an intermediation service run 
by the platform and the presence of  three contracts (intermediation contract between 
the platform and the “host”: B2B or B2C if  the host is a non-professional individual; 
intermediation contract between the platform and the “guest”: B2C; accommodation 
or house rental between the “host” and the “guest”: B2C or P2P). Besides the public 
policy concerns regarding this sector (gentrification of  cities, scarcity of  housing, 
increase of  rentals, for instance) some regulatory control may be necessary concerning 
that intermediation service and the risks of  imbalance between the counterparts. This 
may result from practices such as non-transparent fixing of  the rating mechanisms or 
excessive commissions, and unilaterally imposing contract terms and conditions, some 
perhaps abusive.
The recent preliminary reference64 concerning the intermediation services 
provided by Airbnb in France proves the regulatory issues are more complex. Should 
the platforms be classified as tourism agents65 or real estate agents? These services 
may be subject to licencing and conditions imposed by national rules. In the Airbnb 
preliminary request the Juge d’instruction du tribunal de grande instance de Paris puts 
the following questions: “1. Do the services provided in France by the company Airbnb 
Ireland UC via an electronic platform managed from Ireland benefit from the freedom 
to provide services contemplated in Article 3 of  Directive 2000/31 of  the European 
Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000? 2. Are the restrictive rules relating to 
the exercise of  the profession of  real estate agent in France, laid down by Law No. 
70-9 of  2 January 1970 on intermediaries in real estate transactions (‘the Hoguet Law’), 
64 Judgment YA and AIRBNB Ireland UC, case C-390-18.
65 In 29 November 2016, the Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo n.º 11 de Barcelona found Airbnb 
platform as an information society service provider and not a tourism agent.
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enforceable against the company Airbnb Ireland UC?”
In fact, the regulatory challenges are multiple and complex and the disputes 
around the world prove that.66
II. Regulatory challenges in the European Union
1. The European legal framework – a matter of  competences
The scenario is one of  horizontal sparsity and fragmentation overlapping the 
diversity of  the “collaborative economy” and of  vertical fragmentation between 
diverse EU rules that apply despite the absence of  a unified political approach at 
the national, regional or even local level, with their legitimate different approaches in 
regard of  touristic accommodation or urban transport. For instance, in most countries, 
a transport service provided for a price higher than its cost is generally reserved to 
taxis or professional drivers. On the other hand, ridesharing a journey that the driver 
would be doing anyway in order to split costs is not subject to any special regulations. 
The risks of  gentrification and other negative consequences of  the touristic boom 
promoted by “low cost” air travel and temporary house rental for tourists led many 
cities to approve limitations on this type of  renting.67
The shortcomings are easy to identify;68 uncertainty, misfit of  regulations in force 
for incumbent industries, potential normative conflict, and regulatory loopholes. The 
European Parliament highlights the negative effects on innovation, competition, and 
consumers. In some Member States, some of  the most prominent platforms were not 
authorised to fragment the Single Market.69 It finds “existing legal provisions are quite 
sparse and call rationally for a common legal framework at EU level, covering some – 
if  not most – activities included in the sharing economy”.70 It calls for a mix of  a top-
down and bottom-up approach. The setting of  common rules should be progressive, 
focus on a few sectors and be “with a view to a possible rolling back of  legislation in 
the medium term”.71
The European Commission policy since 2015 evidences a nuanced evolution. 
66 The expansion strategy of  major platforms “prioritizes market share gain and first mover 
advantages” and the “buzz” it creates is beneficial because the enthusiasm of  its participants works 
as lobbying to overcome local restrictions on the business. Carmelo Cennamo and Juan Santalo, 
“Platform competition: strategic trade-offs  in platform markets,” Strateg. Manag. J., vol. 34, issue 11 
(2013): 1331-1350; Parente et al., “The Sharing Economy Globalization Phenomenon…”, 55.
67 The European Commission presents an overview of  some of  the national regulations on transport in the 
Staff  Working Document Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions – A European Agenda for the 





68 Collaborative economy and traditional providers identified insufficiently adapted regulatory 
framework and uncertainty as the major concerns. European Commission, Synopsis Report on the 
Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries and the Collaborative 
Economy, 2016, p. 21, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/full-report-results-public-
consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries.
69 European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe…, 26.
70 European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe…, 18.
71 European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe…, 29.
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In the Digital Single Market Strategy,72 it intended to advance with a new regulatory 
framework for online platforms. Yet, in that same year, in the Communication on 
Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for people and business,73 the 
Commission seems to favour, instead, a soft law approach to provide guidance on how 
EU law applies to collaborative economy business models, rather than a mandatory 
new European legal framework. In 2016, the Commission finds a need for a specific 
approach to different industries and underlines the danger that “legislation developed 
for conventional industries is wrongfully applied to markets in the sharing economy”.74 
In the Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, the European Commission follows 
a cautious approach of  clarifying the regulatory environment with the aim of  
“supporting consumers, businesses and public authorities to engage confidently in 
the collaborative economy”. It intends to monitor the economic development and 
the regulatory environment at national, European and international levels, through 
periodic surveys of  consumers and business, collecting statistical data end evidence, 
ongoing mapping of  regulatory developments, stakeholder dialogue in the framework 
of  the Single Market Forum to assess the development and identify good practices, 
with results summarised in the Single Market Scoreboard. Upon that the priority is to 
encourage the exchange of  good practices75 analyse how regulatory loopholes need 
addressing.76
Among stakeholders, there is no consensus even if  fragmentation was found the 
major barrier to the development of  collaborative economy by the respondents of  the 
Consultation led by the European Commission.77 Some caution is in order against a 
rigid regulatory framework because it may curtail the development of  innovation; on 
the other hand, public policy objectives, consumer rights or fair competition demand 
some kind of  regulation. However, “what kind of  regulation”? For some, if  the services 
provided are similar to the ones provided by incumbent industries, regulation should 
be the same. Others find that special regulation or at least some adaptation is needed. 
Though no specific regulatory framework is in force for the “sharing/collaborative 
economy”, law is not absent. European78 and national law, be it civil, commercial, 
72 European Commission, Communication on online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities 
and Challenges for Europe, COM(2016) 288/2, Brussels, 25.5.2015, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/communication-online-platforms-and-digital-single-market-opportunities-and-
challenges-europe.
73 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, Upgrading 
the Single Market: more opportunities for people and business Brussels, 28.10.2015, COM(2015) 550 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/14007?locale=en 
74 European Commission, Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for 
Platforms…, 21.
75 The European Commission sent to Member States a questionnaire entitled “Good practices in 
promoting Collaborative Economy Businesses” (a summary of  the responses can be found in European 
Commission, Staff  Working Document Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions 
- A European Agenda for the Collaborative economy - supporting analysis…, 47-49).
76 European Commission, A European Agenda for the collaborative economy…, 15.
77 European Commission, Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for 
Platforms…, 22-23.
78 A broad analysis of  European law and the collaborative economy can be found in Vassilis 
Hatzopoulos, The Collaborative Economy and EU law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018); Pieter Van 
Cleynenbreugel, “Le droit de l’Union européenne face à l’économie collaborative,” RTDEur, vol. 
(oct-dec., 2017): 697-722.
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administrative, labor or criminal law may apply. 
Several rules of  European Union law are relevant.79
Primary law: i) Charter of  Fundamental Rights: Article 15 (freedom to choose 
an occupation and right to engage in work), Article 16 (freedom to conduct a 
business), Article 17 (right to property), Article 20 (equality before the law), Article 
21 (nondiscrimination), Article 31 (fair and just working conditions), Article 34 
(social security and social assistance); ii) TEU: Article 2 (the values of  freedom 
and non-discrimination), Article 3 (the Internal Market), Article 5 (subsidiarity and 
proportionality); iii) TFEU: Articles 45 to 48 (freedom of  movement for workers), 
Articles 49 to 55 (right of  establishment), Articles 56 to 62 (services), Articles 90 to 
100 (transport), Article 102 (abuse of  a dominant position in competition), Articles 
114 and 115 (approximation of  laws in view of  the establishment and functioning of  
or affecting the Internal Market), Article 195 (tourism).
Secondary law general rules –  B2C and B2B relations: i)  B2C: Directive 2005/29/ 
EC (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive); Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer 
rights; Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms on consumer contracts; Directive 
2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes; Regulation 
EU/524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes; ii)  B2B: Directive 
2006/114 concerning misleading and comparative advertising.
Secondary law rules relating to services: Directive 2006/123 (provision of  services 
in the Internal Market); Directive 2000/31 (E-commerce); Directive 98/34 (codified 
by Directive 2015/1535 and laying down a procedure for the provision of  information 
in the field of  technical regulations and of  rules on Information Society services).
EU rules on transport services: Article 58/1 TFEU refers to “freedom to provide 
services in transport” and submits these services not to the general rules on freedom to 
provide services (Articles 56 to 62 TFEU and Secondary Acts enacted by the EU like 
Directive 2006/123 and Directive 2000/31) but to lex specialis transport policy rules 
enshrined in Articles 90 to 100 TFEU.80 Transport policy has not developed broadly.81 
Naturally, attention focused on transport services with a transnational dimension and 
not on urban transport. The European Union did not enact any rules on access and 
conditions for urban transport services. For now, transport services such as the one 
provided by digital platforms like Uber are not under the scope of  any rules enacted by 
the European Union. Moreover, Directive 2006/123 (Article 2/2/d) excludes services 
in the field of  transport falling within the scope of  Title V [of  Part Three] of  the [EC] 
Treaty [now Title VI of  Part Three of  the FEU Treaty] and Recital 21 of  the Preamble 
explicitly states: “Transport services, including urban transport, taxis and ambulances 
as well as port services, should be excluded from the scope of  this Directive.” 
Transport is a shared competence of  the European Union and Member States 
as enshrined in Article 4/2/g) TFEU. According to Article 2/2 TFEU, “[w]hen the 
Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific 
area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in 
that area. Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union 
79 Enes, “The Collaborative Economy as a Matter of  Competences…”, 393-394.
80 These are not exceptional rules. Friedl Weiss and Clemens Kaupa, European Union Internal Market 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 242. Opinions of  the Advocate-General in cases 
C-340/14 and C-341/14 (paragraph 28) and Advocate-General N. Wahl in case “Grupo Itevelesa and 
Others” (C-168/14, EU:C:2015:351, paragraph 22).
81 Matthias Ruete, “60 ans de politique européenne de transports,” Revue du droit de l’Union européenne 
n. 4 (2018): 35-56.
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has not exercised its competence”. Since the EU has no rule on this, the setting of  
conditions for the provision of  that service is under the scope of  Member State rules 
and digital platforms such as Uber have to comply with each Member State’s rules if  
they want to provide their services in their respective territory.82 
After a period of  tumultuous conflict with incumbent industries like taxis, some 
Member States enacted special legislation for the provision of  transport through digital 
platforms.83 
Being under the scope of  national rules does not mean that transport service 
providers are not under the scope of  other Treaty rules like freedom of  establishment84 
and principles like non-discrimination or proportionality. In fact, Member States were 
since their binding to the Treaty under a “standstill” obligation not to change their 
national rules in a way to make them “less favourable in their direct or indirect effect 
on carriers of  other Member States as compared with carriers who are nationals of  
that State.” (Article 92 TFEU). In general, Member States “are bound by the obligation 
of  sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4/3 TEU” meaning they must not hinder 
European Union law in force and the general principles, including the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights. They “must exercise their competences consistently with EU law 
(…), particularly given that the large extent of  their powers in transport is not the 
recognition of  an essential State function recognized in Article 4/2 TEU or a power 
not conferred to the Union.”85
As for accommodation platforms such as Airbnb, the recent preliminary 
reference raises some important issues as well. Yet, there are some major differences. 
First, if  the service they provide is an intermediation service distinct from the 
underlying accommodation service or house rental digital platform, companies are not 
the providers of  accommodation or house rental services. This sector is also highly 
regulated in all Member States.86 
The intermediation service provided by digital platforms is under the scope 
of  the rules on freedom to provide services (Article 56 to 62 TFEU, Directive 
2006/123) and an information society service under the scope of  Directive 2000/31. 
Any national rules affecting this freedom are subject to Directive 98/34 (codified 
by Directive 2015/1535) requirements. These Acts intend to promote and simplify 
82 Case Elite Taxi, paragraph 47.
83 In Portugal, Lei º 45/2018 “Lei do transporte em veículo descaracterizado a partir de plataforma 
eletrónica – TVDE” was enacted in 10 August and is in force since 1 November 2018.  This Act 
seems “tailor-made” to platforms such as Uber. Platforms of  the kind of  Blablacar or MyTaxi (Article 
1/3/4) are explicitly outside its scope. Portuguese law is not very consistent with CJEU case-law. 
It distinguishes three types of  operators: the platform operator, the TVDE operator (necessarily a 
commercial company), and the driver (necessarily working for a transport operator). The transport 
service provider is the TVDE operator and not the platform operator. This provides only “the 
intermediation service between users and TVDE operators adhering to the platform” (Article 16) but 
is jointly responsible by the transport service provided to passengers [Article 20(1)]. 
84 In judgment Yellow Cab Judgment the Court stated that the provisions on freedom of  establishment 
“are applicable directly to transport” (C-338/09, EU:C:2010:814, paragraph 33).
85 Enes, “The Collaborative Economy as a Matter of  Competences…”, 393; Perrine Simon, “Uber saisi par le 
droit du marché intérieur,” Revue des Affaires européens, n. 3 (2017): 521-532.
86 In Portugal besides the “Regime Jurídico dos Empreendimentos Turísticos (RJET)” approved by Decreto-
Lei n.º 80/2017, there are several specific regulations for the different types of  touristic facilities, http://
business.turismodeportugal.pt/pt/Planear_Iniciar/Como_comecar/Empreendimento_Turisticos/
Paginas/legislacao-empreendimentos-turisticos.aspx; house accommodation provided by “Alojamento 
local” services is ruled by Decreto-Lei n.º 128/2014, modified by Decreto-Lei n.º 63/2015 and Decreto-
Lei n.º 62/2018. The “Código Civil” rules house rental and several other special rules are apply.
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access (Article 5/1 of  Directive 2006/123). Reasons of  public policy or public 
interest allow Member States to impose certain requirements such as certificates or 
attestations always respecting non-discrimination and the proportionality test, under 
the conditions set by those EU Acts (Article 5/2 of  Directive 2006/123). Submission 
to prior authorisations on establishment is under the strict conditions laid by Articles 
9 and 10 of  Directive 2006/123. Several requirements are strictly prohibited (Article 
14 of  Directive 2006/123) and others are subject to evaluation (Article 15 of  Directive 
2006/123). Besides, the freedom to provide services by providers established in other 
Member States cannot be hindered by national requirements that do not comply with 
non-discrimination and proportionality. Some requirements are excluded (Article 
16/1 and Article 16/2 of  Directive 2006/123), namely imposing the need for a local 
establishment or infrastructure or even entry in a register with a professional body or 
association. Any requirements must be justified on grounds of  public policy, public 
security, public health or the protection of  the environment (Article 16/3 of  Directive 
2006/123). Some case-by-case measures related to the safety of  services are admitted 
under the conditions set by Article 17 of  the Directive 2006/123. Directive 2000/31 
on information society services too has a liberalising intent and enshrines conditions 
on requirements imposed by Member States. First, it excludes any prior authorisations 
on information society services providers (Article 4/1) but without prejudice “to 
authorisation schemes which are not specifically and exclusively targeted at information 
society services” [Article 4(2)].
Even if  that intermediation service were to classify as a touristic intermediation 
service and an information society service only in an implicit or incidental manner, 
they would be submitted to those provisions of  the Single Market. Directive 2006/123 
includes services like the ones provided by travel agencies or touristic and entertainment 
services (Preamble, Recital 33).87 Because they are provided by means of  a digital 
platform, they are under the scope of  Directive 2000/31.88 Reasons of  public policy 
or public interest allow Member States to impose some requirements on the provision 
of  services such as these, for instance registration or liability insurance. In Portugal, the 
professional service provision of  an accommodation reservation is ruled by Decreto-
Lei n.º 17/2018 as a tourism and travel agent activity in Article 3(1)(c). Yet, if  it is a mere 
intermediation service for the sale or reservation of  single travel services requested by 
the customer, it does not fall within the services reserved exclusively for travel agents 
and tourism, according to Article 4(2)(e). This is exactly what happens with on-demand 
reservation services such as the ones Airbnb provide.
The preliminary reference regarding Airbnb services in France views that activity 
from a different perspective, as the provision of  real estate intermediation services 
for the temporary rental of  a house. These, however, are included in the scope of  
Directive 2006/123 (Preamble Recital 33) and Directive 2000/31. Again, Member 
States may impose requirements on providers of  those services for reasons of  public 
policy or public interest on the grounds mentioned above. Could these reasons be the 
87 Touristic services are also the subject of  several EU Acts, like Directive 2015/2302 on package travel 
and linked travel arrangements, amends Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU. 
Yet, services such as that of  digital platforms like Airbnb fall outside the scope of  these Acts. In 
Portugal, it was implemented by Decreto-Lei n.º 17/2018, of  8 March, which also regulates broadly 
access to and exercise of  the activity of  travel and tourism agencies.
88 In joined cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France/Louis Vuitton, the Court underlined the key 
criterion when an online platform is deemed an ‘intermediary service provider,’ referring to recital 42 
to Directive 2000/31.
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ground for regulating and imposing requirements like licences or authorisations to that 
intermediation service? These are precisely the questions put by the French court.
2. Other challenges: sustainability, liability, labour rights, 
consumer protection, competition
The sustainability and social gains claimed by sharing enthusiasts may be 
questioned.89 Users seem to be more motivated by economic gains than those concerns. 
Lower prices increase the demand and, therefore, consumption will increase with all its 
externalities. The ecological footprint of  massive world tourism created by low cost air 
travel and accommodation sharing platforms seems to be significant.90 With regards to 
urban mobility, if  private cars are underused, they can be used to provide services in 
mobility sharing platforms, which could improve efficiency and reduce the number of  
cars in city streets. Yet, things may not be that simple. More pollutant effects result from 
increased circulation of  underused cars and there is a greater wear of  the vehicle and 
need of  faster substitution. Moreover, easier access to private transport may prevent 
a change of  habits to collective urban transport, the best environmental alternative 
and that would have a much more positive effect on the decongestion of  city traffic. 
The distribution of  gains seems to favour those that have the most valuable assets “to 
share” deepening social inequalities.
In this “new economy”, the work is organized in projects and using a “liquid 
workforce” consisting of  any user connected to the internet anywhere around the 
world “able to do the right things in an adaptable, change-ready”91 and “in many cases 
(…) for free.”92 Platforms state these persons are not workers, but “entrepreneurs”, 
independent contractors who assume all the risks of  the service provided. Uber 
claimed in Aslam-Farrar to be an “agent” between drivers and passengers. Courts did 
not accept this view and found platforms liable for damages suffered by recipients of  
the transport or accommodation service.
If  service providers registered in platforms were drivers, couriers or plumbers, 
they are not workers and thus cannot benefit from labour laws and the platform 
companies are not bound to pay minimal wage93 or to guarantee any working or social 
protection duties.94 Again, the issue went on to courts and decisions were different.95 
89 Koen Franken, “Editorial, Sustainability perspectives on the sharing economy”, Environmental 
Innovation and Societal Transitions 23 (2017): 1-2, https://ac.els-cdn.com/S2210422417300825/1-s2.0-
S2210422417300825-main.pdf?_tid=de47e922-b11a-4883-bf59-9b3f424b4a1a&acdnat=154800520
3_0c941de039c49c15817c24ce1d09506d.
90 Nikola Mečiarová, “Tourists: what is their ecological footprint?”, Ecobnb, 12 March 2018, https://
ecobnb.com/blog/2018/03/tourists-ecological-footprint/; The United Nations Agency for Tourism 
proposes a policy approach to cope with those issues and promote a sustainable tourism. UNWTO, 
Tourism and the Sustainable Development Goals – Journey to 2030, Highlights, January 2018, https://www.e-
unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/9789284419401. 
91 Accenture, Accenture Technology Vision 2016…, 11.
92 Accenture, Accenture Technology Vision 2016…, 15.
93 A huge part of  Uber drivers leaves the company within a year because earnings are below 
expectations. In 2017, the Federal Trade Commission accused Uber of  misleading drivers about how 
much they could earn, and Uber settled for $20 million in early 2017. Noah Smith, “Uber Better Not 
Be the Future of  Work”, Bloomberg Opinion, March 8, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2018-03-08/uber-drivers-earn-pay-that-s-just-above-the-poverty-line.
94 One of  the major problems has to do with limiting the working hours according with the “working 
time directive”.
95 The California Labor Commissioner found that a driver was an independent contractor. The Court 
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In fact, this issue relates to the nature of  the service provided by the platform. In 
the US, courts that considered Uber an intermediation company, found drivers were 
independent contractors but admitted that if  the company was a transport provider the 
relation with the drivers could be seen in a different light.
In Europe, the most notorious was the “Aslam and Farrar” case that found that 
drivers were not independent contractors but instead, were under a another category 
of  workers that anyway were entitled to minimal wage and other rights.96 The key 
point is the way Uber controls work details. In the UK, the final report of  the “Taylor 
Review”97 recommended a new institute of  “dependent contractor” adequate to the 
needs of  flexibility of  the “new economy”.98
Faced with these challenges, though not recognising them as workers, Uber offers 
to some of  its drivers (independent drivers and drivers working for partner companies 
but who own the company or are its single driver) automatically and without any cost, 
a collective insurance contract negotiated at European level. That insurance covers 
personal damages or death of  the driver resulting from car accidents while driving 
passengers, illness, and parental leave. Nevertheless, it imposes several requirements 
regarding a minimal threshold of  rides accepted. The damage caused to passengers by 
the same car accidents are not covered by that insurance.
There are also consumer protection challenges. One feature of  the “sharing/
collaborative economy” is the increasing amount of  services provided transnationally 
by non-professionals but for a price higher than the cost of  the service – P2P services. 
These services are only under the scope of  private contract law but, because of  the 
opportunities offered by the platforms, that provision of  services usually becomes 
regular even if  it is not the main activity of  the provider. If  the activity was to be 
considered professional, the contracts would fall under the scope of  B2C acts and 
recipients of  services would get better protection. The first issue arising in this regard 
is the definition of  “professional”. There is no common one and national laws differ. 
The Commission99 puts forward the following criteria: frequency of  service provision; 
decided otherwise, https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1
&article=1988&context=historical. In California the first collective action was admitted and even if  it 
was not intended to determine if  drivers were independent contractor or employees the common-law 
“Borello test” applicable to that issue was passed and was found to give some support to the second 
one. United States District Court, Northern District of  California, case O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL 6354534 (United N.D. Cal), http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/EMC/
OConnorvUberTechnologies.  
96 Judgment of  the London Employment Tribunal of  October 28, 2016, Aslam, Farrar and Others–
v-Uber, case 2202551/2015, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/mr-y-aslam-mr-j-farrar-and-
others-v-uber/. After an appeal dismissed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the case is not over. 
Last appeal to Court of  Appeal was also dismissed on December 19, 2018, case No. A2/2017/3467, 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/uber-bv-ors-v-aslam-ors-judgment-19.12.18.
pdf, but with a dissenting opinion from Lord Justice Underhill. Another appeal to the UK Supreme 
Court is to be expected. In June 13, 2018 the Court of  Appeal decided in a similar way in regard of  
“Pimlico Plumbers”, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2017-0053-judgment.pdf.
97 “Good work: the Taylor review of  modern working practices”, July 2017, https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/good-work-the-taylor-review-of-modern-working-practices. 
98 On this issue see Carmen Grau, “Economia Colaborativa y Trabajadores Independientes: 
Del Surgimiento de una Nueva Categoria de Trabajadores,” Collaborative Economy: Challenges and 
Oportunities…, 45-64; Esther Guerrero Vizuete, “El Provedor de Servicios en la Economia de las 
Plataformas: Contradiciones y Ambigüedades desde una Perspectiva Laboral,” Collaborative Economy: 
Challenges and Oportunities…, 65-81.
99 Agenda for the collaborative economy, 5.
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profit; business turnover. When those criteria are not fulfilled and the relation is truly 
P2P, is there any need for European regulation or even national one? Because there is a 
huge increase of  transnational low value contracts between non-professionals dispute 
resolution, according to the rules in force (national and European), this may not be 
fit. Platforms have their own settlement mechanisms, but these raise some concerns 
regarding due process (in fact, platforms set and apply the rules themselves). Specific 
rules may be needed too in relation to data protection in P2P relations. 
Another problematic issue in this regard arises from reputation mechanisms. 
These are a key factor in the sharing/collaborative economy100 to build trust in a large 
and unknown community but they are not very accurate and may raise concerns of  
privacy protection, exclusion resulting from prejudice, and the because of  consequences 
of  bad ratings (Uber disconnects drivers whose ratings are below a certain threshold 
the company imposes).101
Again, in competition law, the new business model brings new challenges, be they 
the result of  partnership with reputed giant corporations102 or the risks of  “predatory” 
behaviour of  the giant platforms after locking users and other collaborators inside their 
system.103 The specificities of  a two-sided business model make it difficult to apply the 
tests in force in fair competition control. 
Incumbent industries like taxis complain of  the lack of  a level-playing field 
because this new business model does not abide to regulations and all the restrictions 
imposed on those, namely licences. After the approval of  special regulations, complaints 
continued because the requirements imposed on platforms are less demanding.104
3. A multilevel constitutionalist approach built upon subsidiarity
This new economy, “collaborative economy”, based on digital platforms, poses 
several regulatory challenges. Of  course, it is not above the law nor outside the 
law. Besides national law, several European acts apply. However, there is no special 
regulatory framework in force to cover this entire economic sector.
One difficulty is the immense diversity involved because besides creating new 
services, most of  this new economy is a new way to do business that changed traditional 
product or service industries, namely transport or accommodation.
The first question is if  there is a need for new regulations. If  the business is not in 
itself  new, the move from a small-scale activity to a massive one poses new regulatory 
demands.105 In addition, traditional incumbent industries may need regulatory reform.
A major concern is not to hinder but instead, promote innovation. A new 
100 Steven Tadelis, “Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets,” Annual Review 
of  Economics, vol. 8 (2016): 321-340, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325. 
Portuguese law does not allow the rating of  passengers.
101 There is a social exclusion general concern in relation of  people that is ill adjusted to new technologies. 
The European Commission does not pay attention to this issue. The European Parliament presents 
some mitigating solutions (European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe…, 29-30).
102 Parente et al., “The Sharing Economy Globalization Phenomenon…”, 58.
103 Franken and Shor, “Putting the Sharing Economy into Perspective…”, 3.
104 In Portugal taxis complain the TVDE does limit access and licencing depends only depends only 
on a registration with the IMT (Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes).
105 Kellen Zale, “When Everything is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of  Scale in the Sharing 
Economy,” 53 San Diego L. Rev. (2016): 949-1016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2866044##.
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regulatory approach may be necessary if  the rules in force are not fit to that end.106 The 
companies claim for a liberal deregulatory approach. Incumbent industries like taxis 
or hotels claim for stricter regulations on platforms to guarantee a level-playing field. 
Derek McKee107 argues that platforms impose uneven restrictions and regulations 
on their partners and are not necessarily freedom enhancing and these may need a 
regulatory approach from policy makers.
New regulations may also be necessary to respond to the negative externalities 
produced. If  positive effects have worldwide reach (for foreign tourists, for instance), 
negative externalities are mostly local (effects on local incumbent industries, 
neighbourhood relations, household policies, urban mobility, etc.). In the European 
Union, effects at the European level must be accounted for, namely the potential 
hindering of  the Single Market of  an outdated and fragmented regulation.
Besides the policy choice in regard of  regulatory alternatives, what is the 
appropriate level to enact regulation? In the European Union, this question takes us to 
the problem of  competences: should regulation be at the European level or should it 
be left to Member States, including the regional and local level? 
The “sharing collaborative economy” is very complex, the regulatory needs and 
effects of  which are multiple and differentiated, and the answer lies in a multilevel 
constitutionalist approach. Multilevel constitutionalism108 is now a solid theoretical 
approach to explain the nature of  European Union and Member States political 
and legal relation. It is also appropriate to assess regulatory policies. Multilevel 
constitutionalism detaches State and Constitution and admits a constitutional system 
beyond the State and interacting with its constitutional order. The European Union 
inspires this approach and is best suited to trial its validity. 
The multilevel constitution of  the EU has one major anchor principle: the 
principle of  conferral limits the competences of  the European Union (Article 5 TEU) 
and implies that all competences not conferred to the Union by the Treaties belong 
to Member States. More important, conferral of  competences does not mean that 
Member States are excluded because some of  the competences conferred are exclusive 
competences of  the Union (Article 3 TFEU) but most of  them are shared competences. 
In this last category, not only the Union is entitled to regulate but Member States 
remain competent to do so as long as the European Union has not ruled [Article 2(2) 
TFEU]. The enactment of  rules by the European Union has a pre-emptive effect and 
Member States no longer are entitled to rule on the same subjects to the extent the 
Union has ruled. The multilevel constitution of  the European Union is not a layered 
compound but an interwoven fabric.109 
This was at the heart of  the CJEU Uber cases. Transport policy is one of  the 
shared competences (Article 4/2 TFEU). Uber’s services were classified as a transport 
service. Transport services are not under the general rules of  the Treaty (Articles 56 to 
106 Parente et al., “The Sharing Economy Globalization Phenomenon…”, 55.
107 Derek McKee, “The platform economy: natural, neutral, consensual and efficient?”, Transnational 
Legal Theory, vol. 8, issue 4 (2017): 455-495.
108 This perspective gained wide acceptance since first proposed by Ingolf  Pernice’s “Bestandssicherung 
der Verfassungen: Verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen zur Wahrung der Verfassungsordnung,” in The 
European constitutional area, eds. R. Bieber and P. Widmer (Zürich: Schulthess, 1995), 225. The Author 
has extensively written and developed this perspective. Recently the multilevel constitutional approach 
was proposed for the digital economy. Pernice, “Risk Management in the Digital Constellation…”.
109 This intertwining of  competences makes the metaphor of  the “marble cake” also illustrative of  the 
European Union’s multilevel constitutionalism.
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62 TFEU) on the provision of  services but under the leges specialis of  transport policy 
and Directive 2006/123 and Directive 2000/31 enacted by the European Union. Since 
the Union has not ruled on the conditions to provide that kind of  transport, these are 
under the scope of  Member States powers. Member States can legitimately exercise 
their competence and set the legal framework for that activity according to Article 
2/2 TFEU (namely, imposing requirements, authorisations or licencing). Nevertheless, 
they are subject to general principles like non-discrimination and rules like Article 92 
TFEU. Uber may claim access to provide transport services, but it has to comply with 
the requirements set by national and local rules. 
The next question is: should the EU enact rules on urban transport? Transport 
services are “traditionally regulated more densely”110 and for that reason, they were 
subject to a separate TFEU title. Urban transport especially may be considered of  public 
interest and for that reason, Article 93 TFEU states: “[a]ids shall be compatible with 
the Treaties if  they meet the needs of  coordination of  transport or if  they represent 
reimbursement for the discharge of  certain obligations inherent in the concept of  a 
public service.”
A multilevel constitutionalist approach is helpful. A second anchor principle of  
the European constitutional system is the subsidiarity principle enshrined in Article 
5(3) TEU. Subsidiarity is a proximity principle (Article 1 TEU) that assumes decisions 
should be taken at the possible closest level to citizens. Because of  that, in shared 
competences, the exercise of  powers by the Union must pass the test set out in Article 
5/3 TEU and in the Protocol on the principle of  subsidiarity and proportionality.
According to Ingolf  Pernice,111 in line with the multilevel constitutional approach, 
the digital revolution poses new challenges and risks that ask for new “creative and 
universal strategies” of  management. In our view, the “sharing economy” is a digital 
business model but it does not demand necessarily global regulations or even European 
ones. The approach needs to be sector specific and recognise different appropriate 
levels of  regulation from European to national and local level. 
Ignoring borders, the digital business model turns every local business into a 
global business. Article 91 TFEU enshrines a general clause in paragraph 1/d to confer 
the Union with broad powers to take “any other appropriate provisions”. It also asks 
the legislator to be aware of  “the distinctive features of  transport” (paragraph 1); states 
that “account shall be taken of  cases where their application might seriously affect the 
standard of  living and level of  employment in certain regions, and the operation of  
transport facilities” (paragraph 2). That is why much of  the regulation is left to local 
authorities. 
This is one of  the best examples of  the importance and reach of  the principle 
of  subsidiarity as enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU on the allocation of  competences. 
The European Union should take it seriously. The scale and the effects are essentially 
regional and local and therefore, it is difficult to pass the subsidiarity test. Transport 
platforms may have been: “an organic response to regulatory market failures” (Bond 
2015, 95) and local authorities should reform the entire sector of  local transport, 
simplifying and innovating.112 In the design of  transport policy, local concerns related 
to mobility, traffic management, urban planning, road safety, and public security are 
decisive. The appropriate level of  regulation is at Member State level and regional and 
110 Advocate General Macjel Szupnar Opinion in cases C-340/14 and C-341/14, paragraph 27.
111 Pernice, “Risk Management in the Digital Constellation…”, Part II, 91.
112 European Parliament, The Cost of  Non-Europe…, 18, 164.
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local authorities should take part into formulating the definition of  this regulatory 
policy. Urban mobility needs to be tackled through regulation sensitive to local 
sensitivities and national and local policy preferences are legitimate, taking into due 
account the transport network available and the type of  city and inhabitants. It is not 
appropriate to have a uniform legal framework in the EU. Admitting the adequacy of  
a special legal framework, no restrictions on transport services provided by platforms 
can jeopardise a public policy to enhance collective transports.  
In the United States, it was not up to federal law to regulate transport platforms 
but instead to States and cities,113 and these are setting the new rules for this new 
business model of  transport (TNC).114 Europe should follow the same approach and 
Article 91/2 TFEU signals the concern with effects at local level. Portugal was a pioneer 
in enacting a special regulatory framework for transport provided by means of  a digital 
platform “and it should be only a matter of  time until currently blocked locations are 
open – probably under stricter rules – for sharing economy firms to operate due to 
strong popular pressure.”115 
Accommodation business even if  intermediated by digital platforms is under 
local and national rules and that is not controversial. Again, the interests at stake and 
the positive and negative effects are essentially local. Moreover, the European Union 
has no competences conferred to rule housing policy and the competences regarding 
tourism are limited “to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of  the Member 
States” (Article 6/d) TFEU, “encouraging the creation of  a favourable environment 
for the development of  undertakings in this sector”, “promoting cooperation between 
the Member States, particularly by the exchange of  good practice” [Article 195(1) 
TFEU], and “excluding any harmonisation of  the laws and regulations of  the Member 
States” [Article 195(2) TFEU].
The intermediation business provided by digital platforms are under the scope 
of  the rules on the freedom to provide services (Articles 56 to 62 TFEU) and 
Directives 2006/123 and 2000/31. Member States may impose restrictions like special 
requirements or authorisations for public policy reasons and make them subject to 
proportionality and non-discrimination. These national measures certainly hinder the 
Single Market and must respect Directive 98/34 (codified by Directive 2015/1535). 
This is the matter under review in the Airbnb preliminary reference.
Should the European Union approve common rules in regard of  those public 
policy requirements to overcome the restrictive effects on national rules? Again, the 
subsidiarity test must be applied following a multilevel constitutionalist approach. 
The challenges mentioned show evidence of  transnational dimension and its 
effects and may demand a European action to decide on a sector specific and a cautious 
and proportionate approach.
113 On the question of  the allocation of  the exercise competences in the United States in light of  the 
“precautionary principle”, see Sarah E. Light, “Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy,” 66 
Emory Law Journal, vol. 66 (2017): 333-394, http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/66/2/light.
pdf; Patrick Gavin, “Regional Regulation of  Transportation Network Companies,” Harvard Law & Policy 
Review, vol. 11 (2017): 337-357, http://harvardlpr.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/HLP105.pdf.
114 In the US California was the first State to create that new category. 34 States and over 60 cities 
introduced special regulations for “TNCs-Transportation Network Companies”. For an analysis of  
the Pennsylvania regulation, see Cathorene McKay, “Uber: The Superlative Example in the Class of  
Transportation Network Companies—Why Pennsylvania’s New Bill Regulating TNCS Is the Key to 
Their Continued Success in the Sharing Economy,” Duq. Bus. L.J. vol. 19 (2017), 51, 74.
115 Parente et al., “The Sharing Economy Globalization Phenomenon…”, 55.
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III. Conclusion
Digital technologies have a revolutionary potential in the economy and society. It 
will bring along new business and new ways to do business. The digital platforms that 
connect people around the world are a good example of  this “new economy” and they 
are the steering engine of  the “sharing/collaborative economy”. The challenges and 
risks are also huge, including in law. Old concepts, like transport or worker, and national 
and European regulatory frameworks are put to the test. The need for new regulations 
was voiced, namely at European level. The European Parliament and the European 
Commission issued policy documents. Legal disputes soon appeared, including the 
application of  European Union law versus the Member States’ law. This happened 
in relation to the services provided by Uber and Airbnb. The CJEU was called to 
adjudicate. In the Uber cases, the Court revisited some ancillary constitutional principles 
of  European Union law regarding competences of  the Union and the Member States. 
The reasoning of  the Court resonates a multilevel constitutionalist approach that is 
enshrined in the Treaties and anchored on conferral and subsidiarity. We believe that to 
be a very much adequate regulatory perspective for this digital new economy so diverse 
and complex at one time global and local.
